Research Overview - Explanation and Metaphysics
I pursue questions about connections between explanation and metaphysics. Explanation has both a subjective aspect and an objective aspect - it is partly about us, and partly about the world. As such it offers a tempting route into questions about the nature of reality and our access to it, and because of this philosophy is full of attempts to use explanation as a guide to metaphysics.
Some of my research on this theme is critical; I show that certain attempts to use explanation as a guide to metaphysics fail. For example, in my work on emergence I show that metaphysical approaches to emergence face the collapse problem, and develop and defend an explanatory view of emergence in their place. In my work on naturalness, I argue against attempts to use metaphysical naturalness to capture certain features of inquiry, and develop and defend a context-dependent notion of naturalness to do this work instead. In my work on explanatory realism I show that the widely-accepted position that all explanations give information about mind-independent metaphysical structure is false.
Some of my research on this theme is more constructive, in that I develop paths from explanation to metaphysics in light of these critical insights. Through a series of papers I have articulated a non-realist backing model of explanation, according to which explanations are supported by dependence relations. On my view some but not all of these backing relations are forms of metaphysical dependence, and so a taxonomy and epistemology of backing relations will provide a route from explanation to metaphysics that does not rely on explanatory realism.
Social Metaphysics and Other Domains
These connections between explanation and metaphysics are particularly salient in social metaphysics, including feminist metaphysics. Typically those who have attempted to connect explanation to metaphysics have assumed some form of realism about explanation - and inquiry more generally - that connects successful, legitimate inquiry to mind-independent metaphysical structure. This model of explanation and of inquiry singularly fails to make sense of research into the social world. Building on my challenges to realist views, my work on this topic addresses foundational questions about the nature of social metaphysics.
I have also been using the resources I’ve developed to explore the role played by explanation in other domains, including AI legislation that protects our "right to explanation", and to connect work on the psychology of explanation to debates about explanation in metaphysics.
I am a member of the JHU Foundations of Mind Group
I pursue questions about connections between explanation and metaphysics. Explanation has both a subjective aspect and an objective aspect - it is partly about us, and partly about the world. As such it offers a tempting route into questions about the nature of reality and our access to it, and because of this philosophy is full of attempts to use explanation as a guide to metaphysics.
Some of my research on this theme is critical; I show that certain attempts to use explanation as a guide to metaphysics fail. For example, in my work on emergence I show that metaphysical approaches to emergence face the collapse problem, and develop and defend an explanatory view of emergence in their place. In my work on naturalness, I argue against attempts to use metaphysical naturalness to capture certain features of inquiry, and develop and defend a context-dependent notion of naturalness to do this work instead. In my work on explanatory realism I show that the widely-accepted position that all explanations give information about mind-independent metaphysical structure is false.
Some of my research on this theme is more constructive, in that I develop paths from explanation to metaphysics in light of these critical insights. Through a series of papers I have articulated a non-realist backing model of explanation, according to which explanations are supported by dependence relations. On my view some but not all of these backing relations are forms of metaphysical dependence, and so a taxonomy and epistemology of backing relations will provide a route from explanation to metaphysics that does not rely on explanatory realism.
Social Metaphysics and Other Domains
These connections between explanation and metaphysics are particularly salient in social metaphysics, including feminist metaphysics. Typically those who have attempted to connect explanation to metaphysics have assumed some form of realism about explanation - and inquiry more generally - that connects successful, legitimate inquiry to mind-independent metaphysical structure. This model of explanation and of inquiry singularly fails to make sense of research into the social world. Building on my challenges to realist views, my work on this topic addresses foundational questions about the nature of social metaphysics.
I have also been using the resources I’ve developed to explore the role played by explanation in other domains, including AI legislation that protects our "right to explanation", and to connect work on the psychology of explanation to debates about explanation in metaphysics.
I am a member of the JHU Foundations of Mind Group
Papers
"Explanatory Distance." (forthcoming) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
(Penultimate draft)
"Power Emergentism and the Collapse Problem." (forthcoming) Philosophy of Science
"Backing Without Realism." (2020) Erkenntnis https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00249-w
(Penultimate draft)
"Social Categories in Context." (2020) Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6(2): 171-187
(Penultimate draft)
"How to Make the Case for Brute Facts." (2018) in Brute Facts, edited by Elly Vintiadis and Constantinos Mekios, Oxford University Press.
(Penultimate draft)
"Against Explanatory Realism." (2018) Philosophical Studies 175 (1):197-219
(Penultimate draft)
“Explanatory Emergence as a Guide to Metaphysical Structure.” (2017) Philosophica 91: 15-48
"Only Explanation Can Reinflate Emergence." (2017) The Philosophical Quarterly, 68 (271): 385–394
(Penultimate Draft)
"Groups and Oppression." (2016) Hypatia 31 (3): 520–536
(Penultimate draft)
"Explanation and the Explanatory Gap." (2016) Acta Analytica 31 (1): 77-88
(Penultimate draft)
"Naturalness in Context." (2016) Inquiry. 59 (4): 319-342
(Penultimate draft)
"Collapsing Emergence." (2015) The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (271): 732-753
(Penultimate draft)
"An Explication of Emergence." (2015) Philosophical Studies 172 (3)653-669
(Penultimate draft)
Reviews
Review of Carl Gillett's Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy (2017) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Review of Books.
"Explanatory Distance." (forthcoming) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
(Penultimate draft)
"Power Emergentism and the Collapse Problem." (forthcoming) Philosophy of Science
"Backing Without Realism." (2020) Erkenntnis https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00249-w
(Penultimate draft)
"Social Categories in Context." (2020) Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6(2): 171-187
(Penultimate draft)
"How to Make the Case for Brute Facts." (2018) in Brute Facts, edited by Elly Vintiadis and Constantinos Mekios, Oxford University Press.
(Penultimate draft)
"Against Explanatory Realism." (2018) Philosophical Studies 175 (1):197-219
(Penultimate draft)
“Explanatory Emergence as a Guide to Metaphysical Structure.” (2017) Philosophica 91: 15-48
"Only Explanation Can Reinflate Emergence." (2017) The Philosophical Quarterly, 68 (271): 385–394
(Penultimate Draft)
"Groups and Oppression." (2016) Hypatia 31 (3): 520–536
(Penultimate draft)
"Explanation and the Explanatory Gap." (2016) Acta Analytica 31 (1): 77-88
(Penultimate draft)
"Naturalness in Context." (2016) Inquiry. 59 (4): 319-342
(Penultimate draft)
"Collapsing Emergence." (2015) The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (271): 732-753
(Penultimate draft)
"An Explication of Emergence." (2015) Philosophical Studies 172 (3)653-669
(Penultimate draft)
Reviews
Review of Carl Gillett's Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy (2017) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Review of Books.
